Auth Bypass in Chi with Cockroachdb

An authentication bypass in a Chi application using CockroachDB typically arises from insufficient verification of identity before data access, combined with database-side assumptions about trust. Chi is a functional routing library for Clojure that encourages explicit request handling; if route handlers skip authorization checks or trust unverified session data, an attacker can manipulate request paths or headers to reach protected endpoints. CockroachDB, as a distributed SQL database, does not inherently enforce application-level identity checks, so the onus is on the Chi app to validate credentials and scopes on every request. A common pattern is to store a user ID in a session or JWT and use it to construct CockroachDB queries such as (str "SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE user_id = " user-id). If the Chi handler does not verify that the authenticated subject matches the requested resource, an attacker can tamper with identifiers (e.g., changing numeric IDs in URLs) to access other users’ data, effectively bypassing authentication.

Another vector involves misconfigured middleware or omitted guard clauses in Chi routes. For example, if a Chi route uses :guard to restrict access but the guard condition relies on incomplete or spoofed claims from an unauthenticated source, the route may still execute. CockroachDB’s transactional model can inadvertently amplify this when application logic builds dynamic queries without parameterized inputs, leading to indirect exposure of data across tenants. Insecure default configurations in development environments, such as disabled authentication flags or permissive network policies, may also allow unauthenticated requests to reach handlers that should require credentials. Because CockroachDB returns query results based solely on what the application asks for, a missing authentication check in Chi can result in direct data exposure, where one tenant’s SELECT inadvertently returns another tenant’s rows due to a missing tenant ID filter in the SQL statement.

LLM/AI Security checks are particularly relevant here because attackers can probe endpoint behavior using prompt injection techniques to discover whether authentication is enforced at the API layer. middleBrick’s LLM/AI Security testing includes system prompt leakage detection and active prompt injection probes, such as attempting to override instructions or exfiltrate data through crafted inputs. These tests can reveal whether a Chi endpoint inadvertently exposes sensitive information or bypasses controls when manipulated. Additionally, insecure consumption patterns—such as accepting raw JSON that maps directly to CockroachDB rows without validation—can lead to unsafe deserialization and privilege escalation. middleBrick’s Unsafe Consumption and Property Authorization checks help identify these gaps by correlating runtime behavior with OpenAPI specifications and validating that each request is properly scoped to the authenticated subject.

To remediate authentication bypass in Chi with CockroachDB, enforce strict identity verification and tenant scoping in every handler. Use parameterized queries to avoid injection and ensure the authenticated subject is validated against the database on each request. Below is a secure Chi route example that retrieves a user profile only when the authenticated user ID matches the requested ID, using a prepared CockroachDB statement.

(ns myapp.routes.profile
  (:require [chi.core :refer [GET route]]
            [next.jdbc :as jdbc]
            [buddy.hashers :as hashers]))

(def db (jdbc/get-db-spec {:dbtype "cockroachdb"
                           :dbname "mydb"
                           :host "localhost"
                           :port 26257
                           :user "appuser"}))

(defn authenticated-user-guard [request]
  (let [token (get-in request [:headers "authorization"])
        subject (some-> token (hashers/verify "" :alg :hs512) :sub)]
    (when subject
      (assoc request :identity subject))))

(def app
  (-> (chi/router)
      (route ["/profile/:user-id"
              {:get {:guard (some-fn :identity identity)
                     :handler (fn [request]
                                (let [user-id (Long/parseLong (get-in request [:path-params :user-id]))
                                      subject (:identity request)]
                                  (if (= subject user-id)
                                    (let [query "SELECT id, email FROM accounts WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2"
                                          result (jdbc/execute! db [query [subject (:tenant-id subject)]])]
                                      {:status 200 :body (first result)})
                                    {:status 403 :body {:error "forbidden"}})))}}]))

This pattern ensures that the subject extracted from the token is used both for guard evaluation and as a parameter in the CockroachDB query, preventing ID substitution attacks. The tenant ID is also included in the WHERE clause to enforce row-level security at the database level, which is critical in multi-tenant deployments.

For broader protection, integrate middleBrick’s CLI tool to scan from terminal with middlebrick scan <url> and detect missing guards or unsafe consumption patterns. If you are integrating into CI/CD, the GitHub Action can add API security checks to your pipeline and fail builds if the risk score drops below your threshold. For continuous monitoring, the Pro plan supports configurable scanning schedules and alerts, helping you catch regressions early. Use these tools to validate that your Chi routes consistently enforce authentication and that CockroachDB queries remain scoped to the authenticated subject.