Auth Bypass in Restify with Cockroachdb
Auth Bypass in Restify with Cockroachdb — how this specific combination creates or exposes the vulnerability
Auth bypass in a Restify service that uses CockroachDB can occur when access controls are enforced at the database level rather than being validated on each request in the API layer. Because CockroachDB supports PostgreSQL wire protocol and standard SQL roles, developers sometimes assume that database permissions alone are sufficient to protect data. In a Restify application, routes should enforce authentication and authorization independently of the database user context. If route handlers construct SQL queries by directly using request-supplied identifiers (e.g., user ID or tenant ID) without validating that the requesting user is permitted to access that resource, an attacker can manipulate parameters to access another user’s data. This is a Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) / IDOR pattern, commonly seen in APIs that expose record IDs in URLs.
Consider a Restify endpoint that retrieves a user profile using a user-supplied user_id and passes it to a CockroachDB query. If the API relies only on a shared database user (or a role with broad SELECT access) and does not verify that the authenticated principal matches the requested user_id, an attacker can change the ID to view or modify other users’ profiles. CockroachDB’s row-level security (RLS) can mitigate this when properly configured, but RLS must be explicitly defined with policies that align with the application’s authentication context. Without verifying the authenticated subject against the policy predicates in SQL, the protection is incomplete. Insecure default configurations or misapplied grants can further widen the gap.
Additionally, if the Restify application connects to CockroachDB using a long-lived connection pool with elevated privileges and the API omits per-request ownership checks, the attack surface grows. An attacker may probe for IDOR by iterating over numeric or UUID identifiers, looking for inconsistent authorization enforcement. The combination of a flexible SQL database and a Node.js API framework that does not consistently enforce object-level checks can inadvertently expose sensitive data or allow unauthorized modifications. This risk is amplified when endpoints expose internal identifiers that should be opaque to clients.
Cockroachdb-Specific Remediation in Restify — concrete code fixes
To remediate auth bypass risks, enforce authorization in the Restify handler before constructing any database query. Always resolve the authenticated subject from the request (e.g., from a verified session or token) and use it as a parameter in SQL statements. Avoid relying on database superuser or broad-privilege roles for API access. Instead, use CockroachDB’s row-level security and parameterized queries to enforce that users can only access their own data.
Example secure handler using parameterized queries with the cockroachdb npm driver:
const restify = require('restify');
const { Client } = require('cockroachdb');
const server = restify.createServer();
const db = new Client({
connectionString: 'postgresql://user:password@host:26257/dbname?sslmode=require',
});
server.get('/profile/:userId', async (req, res, next) => {
const authenticatedUserId = req.auth && req.auth.userId; // from JWT or session
const requestedUserId = req.params.userId;
if (!authenticatedUserId || authenticatedUserId !== requestedUserId) {
return next(new restify.NotAuthorizedError('Invalid credentials'));
}
try {
const result = await db.query(`
SELECT id, email, display_name
FROM user_profiles
WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2
`, [requestedUserId, authenticatedUserId]); // ensure tenant/ownership matches
if (result.rows.length === 0) {
return next(new restify.NotFoundError('Profile not found'));
}
res.send(result.rows[0]);
next();
} catch (err) {
return next(new restify.InternalServerError(err.message));
}
});
server.listen(8080, () => {
console.log('API listening on port 8080');
});
On the CockroachDB side, define a row-level security policy that restricts rows to the authenticated tenant or user. For example, create a policy on user_profiles that ensures users only see rows matching their tenant and user ID:
-- Assume tenant_id and user_id are columns in user_profiles
CREATE POLICY user_own_profile ON user_profiles
FOR SELECT
USING (tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::UUID
AND id = current_setting('app.user_id')::UUID);
In your Restify application, set these session-specific settings at the start of each request:
server.pre((req, res, next) => {
const tenantId = getTenantIdFromToken(req); // extract from auth context
const userId = req.auth && req.auth.userId;
if (tenantId && userId) {
db.query(`SET app.tenant_id = '${tenantId}', app.user_id = '${userId}'`);
}
return next();
});
These steps ensure that authorization is validated in the API layer and enforced by CockroachDB policies, reducing the chance of auth bypass through ID manipulation or privilege misuse.
Related CWEs: authentication
| CWE ID | Name | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| CWE-287 | Improper Authentication | CRITICAL |
| CWE-306 | Missing Authentication for Critical Function | CRITICAL |
| CWE-307 | Brute Force | HIGH |
| CWE-308 | Single-Factor Authentication | MEDIUM |
| CWE-309 | Use of Password System for Primary Authentication | MEDIUM |
| CWE-347 | Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | HIGH |
| CWE-384 | Session Fixation | HIGH |
| CWE-521 | Weak Password Requirements | MEDIUM |
| CWE-613 | Insufficient Session Expiration | MEDIUM |
| CWE-640 | Weak Password Recovery | HIGH |