Bola Idor in Actix with Cockroachdb

Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA), also known as Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR), occurs when an API exposes internal object references (e.g., record IDs) without verifying that the requesting user has permission to access that specific object. In an Actix web service backed by CockroachDB, this typically arises when endpoints use predictable identifiers (UUIDs or integers) and skip ownership or tenant checks before querying the database.

Consider an endpoint like /users/{user_id}/profile. If the handler retrieves the profile using a raw user_id from the path and queries CockroachDB without confirming the authenticated actor owns that user_id, an attacker can change the ID to access another user’s profile. Because CockroachDB is a distributed SQL database often used in production for strong consistency and horizontal scalability, developers may assume the database enforces access boundaries. However, SQL-level constraints or row-level security policies are not automatically applied by Actix or an ORM; if the application does not encode authorization in every query, BOLA persists.

When using an ORM like SeaORM or Diesel with CockroachDB in Actix, BOLA can be introduced through dynamic query building that concatenates user-supplied IDs without scoping by tenant or actor. For example, a handler might deserialize a path parameter into a UUID and directly pass it to a find_by_id method. If the endpoint is public-facing or relies on unauthenticated/lightweight authentication (as middleBrick scans for), an attacker can iterate IDs and enumerate accessible resources. MiddleBrick’s BOLA checks look for missing authorization at the data-access layer and test whether object identifiers are predictable and whether responses differ meaningfully across unauthorized requests.

In distributed setups, Cockroachdb’s secondary indexes and multi-region capabilities can inadvertently expose relationships between records if foreign-key constraints or unique indexes are not aligned with authorization logic. An attacker might leverage IDOR to traverse relationships (e.g., by modifying a foreign key reference to another tenant’s row) if the application does not validate that the related record belongs to the same tenant or subject. MiddleBrick’s unauthenticated scan can surface these patterns by analyzing the OpenAPI spec for endpoints that accept object references and by observing inconsistent responses across modified IDs.

Real-world attack patterns include changing numeric identifiers (e.g., order_id=1001 to 1002) or swapping UUID path parameters to access sibling resources. In regulated contexts, this can lead to disclosures of PII or financial data, mapping to OWASP API Top 10 A01:2023 — Broken Object Level Authorization. MiddleBrick’s findings include severity, guidance to scope queries by actor/tenant, and mappings to compliance frameworks such as PCI-DSS and SOC2.

Remediation centers on ensuring every data access is scoped to the actor’s permissions or tenant, using parameterized queries and avoiding raw ID passthrough. In Actix, this means tying authorization to the request’s identity (e.g., JWT subject or API key) and embedding tenant context into queries against Cockroachdb.

Example using SeaORM with explicit tenant scoping and prepared statements:

use sea_orm::{DatabaseConnection, EntityTrait, QueryFilter};
use myapp::models::{User, UserProfile};
use myapp::sea_orm_active_enums::UserId;

async fn get_profile(
    db: &DatabaseConnection,
    actor_id: UserId,
    requested_profile_id: UserId,
) -> Result, DbErr> {
    // Ensure the actor can only fetch their own profile
    if actor_id != requested_profile_id {
        return Err(DbErr::Custom("Unauthorized".to_owned()));
    }
    UserProfile::find()
        .filter(user_profile::Column::Id.eq(requested_profile_id))
        .one(db)
        .await
}

Example using Diesel with CockroachDB and tenant-aware scoping:

use diesel::prelude::*;
use crate::schema::user_profiles::dsl::*;
use crate::models::UserProfile;

fn get_profile_conn(
    conn: &PgConnection,
    actor_id: i64,
    requested_id: i64,
) -> QueryResult {
    // Apply tenant/actor scoping in the filter
    user_profiles.filter(id.eq(requested_id).and(user_id.eq(actor_id)))
        .first(conn)
}

For raw SQL against Cockroachdb in Actix routes, always parameterize identifiers and include tenant or user context:

async fn get_order(
    pool: &DbPool,
    actor_tenant_id: &str,
    order_id: &str,
) -> Result {
    let row = sqlx::query_as(
        "SELECT id, tenant_id, data FROM orders WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2",
    )
    .bind(order_id)
    .bind(actor_tenant_id)
    .fetch_one(pool)
    .await?;
    Ok(row)
}

Additionally, define row-level security policies in CockroachDB where supported, and ensure that indexes support queries that include tenant or actor columns to avoid full table scans. MiddleBrick’s CLI can validate that your endpoints consistently apply such scoping by running middlebrick scan <url> and reviewing BOLA findings; the Pro plan’s continuous monitoring can alert you if new endpoints are introduced without proper authorization checks.

Finally, enforce authorization at the handler level before constructing database queries, and prefer parameterized queries or an ORM that encourages scoped access. Regular scans with the middlebrick CLI or GitHub Action can integrate these checks into CI/CD to prevent regressions.