Bola Idor in Chi with Cockroachdb

BOLA (Broken Object Level Authorization) / IDOR occurs when an API exposes internal object identifiers without verifying that the requesting identity has permission to access the targeted resource. In Chi, a common pattern is to define route parameters like :id and use them directly in database queries. When those identifiers reference database rows or objects stored in Cockroachdb, failing to enforce ownership or tenant boundaries means an attacker can change the ID and access another user’s data simply by making modified requests.

With Cockroachdb, IDs are often UUIDs or big integers used in SQL statements such as SELECT * FROM invoices WHERE id = $1. If the application does not also validate that the authenticated subject (e.g., a user or client) is allowed to view or modify that specific row, the API becomes vulnerable. Chi’s idiomatic handlers that bind URL parameters and pass them straight to Cockroachdb without a permissions check are a typical vector. For example, an endpoint like GET /tenants/{tid}/invoices/{id} might use tid and id in a Cockroachdb query. If the handler trusts the client-supplied tid or id and omits tenant-aware filtering, an attacker can enumerate IDs and pivot across tenants or records.

Another contributing factor is schema design in Cockroachdb. If primary keys or indexes do not incorporate tenant or scope constraints, it becomes easier for an attacker to traverse relationships by guessing adjacent IDs. Because Cockroachdb supports distributed SQL and strong consistency, attackers can reliably probe sequential or predictable identifiers, making enumeration feasible. Without proper authorization checks at the data-access layer, each crafted request retrieves or modifies objects the subject should not see, turning a simple lookup into a BOLA/IDOR breach.

Chi applications often rely on middleware to inject user context, but if that context is not applied consistently to Cockroachdb queries, the vulnerability persists. For instance, a handler may authenticate a user but then construct SQL like SELECT * FROM documents WHERE id = $1 using only the URL parameter. If the user context is not used to scope the query (for example, by adding a tenant_id = $2 condition), the authentication step becomes insufficient. This mismatch between authentication and authorization at the object level is the root cause of BOLA/IDOR in this stack.

Real-world attack patterns mirror this: an attacker intercepts a valid request to GET /chi/records/12345, changes the ID to 12346, and observes whether the response reveals another record. If the Cockroachdb query lacks row-level security or explicit tenant checks, the API may return the data with a 200 status, confirming the vulnerability. The presence of Cockroachdb does not inherently mitigate this; it requires deliberate schema and query design to enforce boundaries.

To remediate BOLA/IDOR in Chi with Cockroachdb, always couple authentication with tenant- or user-specific filters in every query. Use parameterized SQL to avoid injection, and ensure that identifiers are validated against an authorization layer before use. Below are concrete code examples that demonstrate secure patterns.

• Parameterized query with tenant scoping in Chi:

import 'server';
import { sql } from '@pgtyped/client';

// Assume req.user contains authenticated identity with tenant_id
// and req.params contains parsed URL parameters
const getInvoice = (req, res) => {
  const { id } = req.params;
  const { tenant_id } = req.user;

  // Safe: use tenant_id from auth context, not from user input
  sql.query(
    `SELECT id, amount, status FROM invoices WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2`,
    [id, tenant_id],
    (err, result) => {
      if (err) { res.status(500).json({ error: 'database' }); return; }
      if (!result.rows.length) { res.status(404).json({ error: 'not_found' }); return; }
      res.json(result.rows[0]);
    }
  );
};

• Using prepared statements with explicit tenant binding:

import 'server';
import { sql } from '@pgtyped/client';

const updateRecord = (req, res) => {
  const { recordId } = req.params;
  const { body } = req;
  const { tenant_id } = req.user;

  sql.query(
    `UPDATE records SET data = $1, updated_at = now() WHERE id = $2 AND tenant_id = $3`,
    [body.data, recordId, tenant_id],
    (err, result) => {
      if (err) { res.status(500).json({ error: 'update_failed' }); return; }
      if (result.rowCount === 0) { res.status(403).json({ error: 'access_denied' }); return; }
      res.json({ updated: true });
    }
  );
};

• Validating identifiers before query construction and using least-privilege database roles:

import 'server';
import { sql } from '@pgtyped/client';
import { uuidRegex } from './validators';

const getDocument = (req, res) => {
  const { docId } = req.params;
  const { tenant_id } = req.user;

  // Basic format validation to prevent malformed queries
  if (!uuidRegex.test(docId)) {
    res.status(400).json({ error: 'invalid_id_format' });
    return;
  }

  sql.query(
    `SELECT doc_id, content FROM documents WHERE doc_id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2`,
    [docId, tenant_id],
    (err, result) => {
      if (err) { res.status(500).json({ error: 'db_error' }); return; }
      if (!result.rows.length) { res.status(404).json({ error: 'not_found' }); return; }
      res.json(result.rows[0]);
    }
  );
};

• Enforcing row-level security in Cockroachdb where applicable:

-- Example of a security barrier view in Cockroachdb
CREATE VIEW tenant_invoices AS
SELECT id, amount, status, tenant_id
FROM invoices
WHERE tenant_id = current_setting('app.tenant_id')::UUID;

-- In Chi, set the session variable per authenticated tenant
const setTenant = (req, res) => {
  const { tenant_id } = req.user;
  sql.query(
    `SET app.tenant_id = $1`,
    [tenant_id],
    () => {
      // Subsequent queries in this session will respect the tenant filter
      res.json({ ok: true });
    }
  );
};

These patterns ensure that object-level authorization is evaluated on every request, using the authenticated subject’s context rather than trusting URL parameters alone. By binding tenant or user identifiers directly in SQL conditions and validating input formats, Chi services reduce the attack surface for BOLA/IDOR against Cockroachdb-backed endpoints.