Bola Idor in Rocket with Cockroachdb

Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) occurs when an API fails to enforce proper access controls between objects that should be isolated between users or roles. In a Rocket service backed by CockroachDB, this risk emerges from a mismatch between how routes identify resources and how database permissions and row-level policies are applied.

Consider a typical Rocket route that uses a path parameter to look up a record:

#[get("/users/<user_id>")]
async fn get_user(user_id: i32, db: &DbConn) -> Option<User> {
    users::table.find(user_id).first(&db.conn).await.ok()
}

If the request only identifies a numeric user_id and the backend queries CockroachDB without confirming that the authenticated actor owns or is permitted to view that user_id, an authenticated attacker can iterate through numeric IDs and access other users’ data. CockroachDB does not inherently enforce object ownership; it executes SQL as issued. Therefore, if your application logic does not embed authorization checks, CockroachDB will return rows as long as they match the query, regardless of the requester’s permissions.

Worse, if your schema uses predictable identifiers (e.g., sequential integers or UUIDs derived from non-sensitive context), enumeration becomes trivial. An attacker does not need to exploit a database misconfiguration; the vulnerability is an application-level authorization gap that is trivially exposed because CockroachDB faithfully executes unguarded queries.

Compounded factors in Rocket+Cockroachdb setups include:

• Use of Diesel or SQLx without joining to an ownership column (e.g., owner_id = current_user_id()) before fetching.
• Inadequate row-level security (RLS) policies in CockroachDB, which must be explicitly defined and verified to be enforced on every relevant table.
• Overly broad database credentials used by the Rocket service, which remove a potential containment layer even if application checks are missed.

In a black-box scan, an API security tool running the LLM/AI Security module may also probe for indirect object references by manipulating parameters across endpoints, testing whether authorization is consistently enforced across the unauthenticated attack surface.

Secure Rocket endpoints backed by CockroachDB by combining strict application-level checks with deliberate database-side controls. Below are concrete, idiomatic patterns.

1. Enforce ownership in the query

Always join or filter by the authenticated subject’s identifier. Avoid relying solely on the path parameter.

use rocket::serde::json::Json;
use rocket::State;
async fn get_user(
    user_id: i32,
    auth: Auth, // contains claims with user_id
    db: &DbConn,
) -> Result<Json<User>, Rocket<Custom<String>>> {
    let current_user_id: i32 = auth.get_user_id().ok_or_else(|| /* 401 */)?;
    let user = users::table
        .find(user_id)
        .filter(users::dsl::owner_id.eq(current_user_user_id))
        .first(&db.conn)
        .await
        .map_err(|e| /* handle not found / error */)?;
    Ok(Json(user))
}

2. Use CockroachDB Row-Level Security (RLS) and verify it

Define RLS policies in CockroachDB and ensure your queries respect them. For example:

-- Enable row-level security on the users table
ALTER TABLE users ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;

-- Policy: users can only see their own row
CREATE POLICY user_own_row ON users
FOR ALL
USING (owner_id = auth.uid()::INT);

In Rocket, even with RLS, include the ownership filter in your application code as defense in depth. RLS can be bypassed if session settings or role assumptions change.

3. Use parameterized queries and avoid dynamic SQL concatenation

Prevent injection and ensure predicate clarity:

sqlx::query_as!(User,
    "SELECT id, name, owner_id FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND owner_id = $2",
    user_id,
    current_user_id
)
.fetch_one(&db.pool)
.await?;

4. Scope database credentials

Use distinct database roles with minimal privileges per service or endpoint when possible. Avoid a single highly privileged role for the entire Rocket service.

5. Validate and canonicalize identifiers

Ensure user_id is properly parsed and cannot be abused for type confusion or off-by-one enumeration:

let user_id: i32 = params.user_id.parse().map_err(|_| /* 400 Bad Request */)?;

These steps align with the checks in the middleBrick dashboard, which maps findings to frameworks such as OWASP API Top 10 and provides prioritized remediation guidance.