Broken Access Control in Adonisjs with Cockroachdb

Broken Access Control in an Adonisjs application backed by Cockroachdb typically arises when authorization logic is missing, incomplete, or bypassed at the API and service-layer boundaries. Because Cockroachdb is a distributed SQL database, the risk is not only about a misconfigured database user, but also about how Adonisjs routes, policies, and queries map identities to data stored in Cockroachdb tables.

Consider an endpoint like GET /api/users/:id implemented in an Adonisjs controller that directly interpolates the route parameter into a Cockroachdb query without verifying that the requesting user owns the record. If the controller does not enforce a policy check and relies only on route authentication (e.g., an auth middleware that validates a JWT but does not enforce scope-based permissions), an attacker can modify the :id to access another user’s data. This is a classic BOLA/IDOR pattern, and it is especially dangerous when the Adonisjs ORM (or raw query) does not enforce tenant or ownership filters on Cockroachdb.

Adonisjs policies, when correctly applied, encapsulate authorization decisions by evaluating the authenticated user’s relationship to the domain model. However, if developers forget to apply the policy to every route, or if they mistakenly query Cockroachdb using a generic model scope that does not incorporate the current user’s identifier, the authorization boundary collapses. For example, a raw orm query that builds a WHERE clause conditionally based on user roles may omit the user id when an admin role is detected, inadvertently exposing all rows in the Cockroachdb table.

Another common vector is mass assignment combined with insufficient property-level authorization. Adonisjs models often use fillable or guarded attributes to control which fields can be updated. If an API accepts user-supplied JSON and merges it into a model without explicit property authorization, an attacker can inject fields that modify permissions or escalate privileges (for example, setting isAdmin to true). When such a model is persisted to Cockroachdb, the unauthorized change is stored and can affect future access checks, creating a persistent access control flaw.

Operational factors exacerbate the issue. Because Cockroachdb supports distributed SQL and strong consistency, developers may assume that database-side controls are sufficient. Relying on Cockroachdb network policies or row-level security alone, without corresponding application-level checks in Adonisjs, leaves a gap: the API layer may still expose endpoints that bypass intended data segregation. Moreover, if OpenAPI specs are not aligned with actual Adonisjs route definitions and Cockroachdb constraints, scanners can detect mismatches that indicate missing authorization checks.

Remediation centers on enforcing ownership and role-based checks in Adonisjs before any Cockroachdb query is issued, and ensuring that every data access path respects the principle of least privilege.

First, always parameterize queries and embed the user identifier in the WHERE clause. Instead of relying on implicit model scopes, explicitly filter by the authenticated user’s primary key. The following example demonstrates a secure Adonisjs controller method using the Lucid ORM with Cockroachdb:

import User from 'App/Models/User'
import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'

export default class UsersController {
  public async show({ params, auth }: HttpContextContract) {
    const user = await User.query()
      .where('id', params.id)
      .andWhere('user_id', auth.user!.id) // ownership filter for Cockroachdb
      .preload('profile')
      .firstOrFail()
    return user
  }
}

Second, implement and apply policies to encapsulate authorization logic. In Adonisjs, a policy should resolve the target record in the context of the current user and return a boolean. For Cockroachdb-backed models, ensure that the policy’s scope includes the tenant or user identifier:

import { BasePolicy } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/Policy'
import User from 'App/Models/User'

export default class UserPolicy extends BasePolicy {
  public async view(currentUser: User, targetId: string) {
    const record = await User.query()
      .where('id', targetId)
      .andWhere('user_id', currentUser.id)
      .from('users')
      .limit(1)
      .execute()
    return record.length > 0
  }
}

Third, guard against mass assignment by strictly defining fillable fields and validating incoming payloads. Use schema validation (e.g., Yup or Joi) to reject unexpected fields such as isAdmin or role. In an Adonisjs route handler, this can be enforced as follows:

import schema from 'App/Validators/user_update_validator'
import User from 'App/Models/User'
import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'

export default class UsersController {
  public async update({ request, response, params, auth }: HttpContextContract) {
    const body = request.validate({ schema })
    // Explicitly exclude role/isAdmin from user-controlled input
    const safeBody = { email: body.email, name: body.name }
    const user = await User.query()
      .where('id', params.id)
      .andWhere('user_id', auth.user!.id)
      .update(safeBody)
    return user
  }
}

Finally, ensure that your OpenAPI/Swagger definitions accurately reflect the required security scopes and that they are cross-referenced with runtime route definitions. When using middleBrick, this alignment helps detect missing authorization checks early, especially when Cockroachdb constraints and Adonisjs routes are involved. For production, combine these coding practices with middleware that enforces role-based access and continuous scanning to surface regressions.