Broken Access Control in Fiber with Cockroachdb

Broken Access Control occurs when API endpoints fail to enforce proper authorization checks, allowing one user to access or modify another user's resources. Using Fiber with Cockroachdb can inadvertently expose this risk when route handlers directly construct queries from user-supplied identifiers without validating the requesting user's ownership or permissions. Because Cockroachdb is a distributed SQL database, developers often write parameterized queries that reference a tenant or user ID extracted from the request context, but if that context is derived solely from route parameters or unverified JWT claims, an attacker can manipulate the identifier to access data that belongs to another tenant or role.

For example, a route like /api/users/:userID/profile might extract userID from the URL and use it in a Cockroachdb query without confirming that the authenticated caller is the same user. If authentication is handled separately but authorization is missing, an attacker can enumerate sequential IDs and read or alter other users' profiles. This maps directly to the BOLA/IDOR checks in middleBrick’s 12 security checks, where the scanner tests whether endpoints enforce proper ownership validation. In a Fiber app that connects to Cockroachdb, the risk is amplified when SQL queries concatenate or interpolate identifiers instead of using strict parameter binding, or when the application layer assumes the database will enforce row-level security without explicit filters.

Additionally, if the API exposes administrative endpoints that query Cockroachdb with elevated privileges and those endpoints lack role-based access controls, an attacker who compromises a low-privilege token might escalate privileges through BFLA or Privilege Escalation checks. Because middleBrick tests for Property Authorization and Authorization at the property level, it will flag endpoints where sensitive fields are returned without verifying the requester’s scope. The combination of Fiber’s lightweight routing and Cockroachdb’s SQL flexibility can lead to implicit trust assumptions: developers might believe that using a prepared statement is sufficient, while missing contextual authorization checks that ensure the requesting user is explicitly linked to the requested resource in the database row.

To remediate Broken Access Control when using Fiber with Cockroachdb, always enforce ownership checks in the handler before constructing any query. Use context-bound user identifiers from authentication middleware and ensure that every SQL statement includes a tenant or user filter. Below are concrete, working examples that demonstrate secure patterns.

Example 1: User-specific profile retrieval with explicit ownership verification

const userID = req.Params('userID')
// Assume ctx.locals.user.id is set by auth middleware and is trusted
const currentUserID = ctx.locals.user.id

// BAD: directly using params without cross-check
// const rows = db.Query(ctx, `SELECT * FROM profiles WHERE id = ${userID}`)

// GOOD: bind both the target ID and the caller's ID, enforcing ownership
const result = await db.QueryRow(ctx, `
  SELECT id, display_name, email FROM profiles 
  WHERE id = $1 AND user_id = $2
`, userID, currentUserID)
if (result.rows.length === 0) {
  return res.Status(403).SendString('Forbidden: you cannot access this resource')
}
// safely use result

Example 2: Admin endpoint with role-based guard and parameterized query

const targetID = req.Params('targetID')
const role = ctx.locals.user.role

// Ensure only admins can query sensitive tables
if (role !== 'admin') {
  return res.Status(403).SendString('Admin access required')
}

// Use parameterized query to prevent injection and ensure explicit filtering
const rows, err := db.Query(ctx, `
  SELECT id, ssn, salary FROM employees 
  WHERE org_id = $1 AND id = $2
`, orgID, targetID)
if err != nil {
  return res.Status(500).SendString('Internal error')
}
defer rows.Close()
for rows.Next() {
  // process rows
}

Example 3: Middleware to enforce tenant scope across Cockroachdb calls

// Fiber middleware that attaches tenant-aware query helper
tenantMiddleware := func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
  tenantID := c.Locals('tenantID')
  if tenantID == nil {
    return c.Status(401).SendString('Unauthorized')
  }
  c.Locals('dbQuery', func(query string, args ...interface{}) (*sql.Rows, error) {
    // Inject tenant filter automatically
    tenantFiltered := injectTenantFilter(query, tenantID.(string))
    return db.Query(c.Context(), tenantFiltered, args...)
  })
  return c.Next()
}

// Usage in a route
app.Get('/api/items', tenantMiddleware, func(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
  queryFn := c.Locals('dbQuery').(func(string, ...interface{}) (*sql.Rows, error))
  rows, err := queryFn('SELECT id, name FROM items WHERE category = $1', category)
  // rows are already scoped to the tenant
})

Best practices summary

• Never trust route parameters or client-supplied identifiers for authorization; validate against the authenticated user context.
• Always use parameterized queries with Cockroachdb to prevent injection and to ensure consistent typing.
• Include the requester’s user ID or tenant ID directly in WHERE clauses to enforce row-level security at the application layer.
• Apply role-based checks before executing sensitive operations, and prefer middleware to centralize scope enforcement.