Broken Access Control in Rocket with Cockroachdb

Broken Access Control (BAC) in a Rocket service using CockroachDB typically occurs when authorization checks are missing, incomplete, or bypassed before data is read from or written to CockroachDB. Because CockroachDB is a distributed SQL database, access control is enforced at the database level (via users, roles, and GRANTs) and at the application level (via your Rocket endpoints). If Rocket endpoints do not validate identity and permissions for each request, an attacker can manipulate parameters (e.g., :user_id, :document_id) to access or modify other users' data stored in CockroachDB.

For example, consider an endpoint intended to fetch a user’s profile using a path parameter like user_id. If Rocket does not verify that the authenticated user is allowed to view the requested user_id, and the SQL query is constructed naively, an authenticated user can change the ID and read another user’s record. With CockroachDB, this can be a simple SQL SELECT with a bound parameter that the application passes without authorization checks:

-- CockroachDB query vulnerable to IDOR when authorization is missing in Rocket
SELECT id, email, display_name FROM users WHERE id = $1;

If the application binds $1 directly from user input without confirming the requester’s ownership or role, this becomes a classic Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) / Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR). An attacker can enumerate IDs or guess predictable identifiers and access data they should not see. This risk is compounded if CockroachDB users used by Rocket have broader privileges than necessary (e.g., a read-write role instead of a least-privilege role limited to the specific tables and operations required).

Additionally, property-level authorization may be missing. Even when row-level access is enforced in application logic, fields within a row might be returned or updated without checking whether the requesting user is permitted to view or modify those specific properties. For instance, an endpoint that updates user email might not verify whether the caller has permission to change email for that user, allowing horizontal privilege escalation across accounts stored in CockroachDB.

Insecure default configurations in CockroachDB can also contribute to BAC. If database roles are not explicitly restricted and network policies allow broader access, an attacker who compromises an application credential might leverage overly permissive CockroachDB permissions to read or modify data outside the intended scope. Proper use of CockroachDB’s role-based access controls, combined with Rocket’s guards on every route, is essential to prevent Broken Access Control.

Remediation focuses on enforcing authorization in Rocket before issuing SQL to CockroachDB, using least-privilege database roles, and parameterizing all queries to avoid injection and ensure proper scoping.

1. Enforce per-request authorization in Rocket

For each endpoint that accesses CockroachDB, validate that the authenticated subject has the right to access the target resource. Use Rocket’s request guards to extract identity and permissions, and apply checks before building SQL.

// Rocket + sqlx example with authorization check
#[get("/users/")]
async fn get_user(
    db: &State,
    user_id: i32,
    current_user: AuthUser, // authenticated guard
) -> Result<Json<User>, ApiError> {
    // Ensure the requester can only access their own data unless they have elevated rights
    if current_user.id != user_id && !current_user.can_view_other_profiles() {
        return Err(ApiError::Forbidden);
    }

    let query = "SELECT id, email, display_name FROM users WHERE id = $1";
    let row = db.fetch_optional(query, &[&user_id]).await?;
    // handle row...
}

2. Use least-privilege CockroachDB roles

Create dedicated database roles for Rocket that match the minimal required permissions. Avoid using a highly privileged role for routine endpoint operations.

-- CockroachDB role setup example
CREATE ROLE rocket_app_read;
GRANT SELECT ON TABLE users TO rocket_app_read;

CREATE ROLE rocket_app_write;
GRANT SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE ON TABLE users TO rocket_app_write;
-- Revoking dangerous permissions like DROP or DDL
REVOKE DROP, CREATE ON DATABASE mydb FROM rocket_app_write;

Then, configure your Rocket application’s CockroachDB connection to use the least-privilege role for each operation (read vs write), limiting the impact of any compromised credential.

3. Parameterized queries and row-level scoping

Always use parameterized queries with CockroachDB to prevent injection and ensure proper value binding. Combine this with row-level filters that include the subject identifier to avoid accidental cross-user access even if application logic fails.

// Safe query with row-level scoping in Rocket using sqlx
let query = "
    SELECT id, email, display_name
    FROM users
    WHERE id = $1 AND team_id = $2
";
let user = db.fetch_optional(query, &[&requested_id, &current_user.team_id]).await?;

By including team_id (or tenant_id) in the WHERE clause, you enforce database-side scoping that complements Rocket’s authorization layer, reducing the risk of IDOR across teams or organizations stored in CockroachDB.

4. Validate and sanitize input

Even with authorization checks, validate input types and ranges before using them in SQL. This prevents malformed queries and ensures that identifiers are within expected bounds.

// Rocket guard to validate user_id before DB use
fn valid_user_id(id: i32) -> bool {
    id >= 1 && id <= 1_000_000
}

#[get("/users/")]
async fn get_user_safe(
    db: &State<Pool>,
    user_id: i32,
) -> Result<Json<User>, ApiError> {
    if !valid_user_id(user_id) {
        return Err(ApiError::BadRequest);
    }
    // proceed with authorized query...
}