Brute Force Attack in Restify with Cockroachdb

A brute force attack against a Restify service backed by Cockroachdb typically exploits insufficient rate limiting and weak account enumeration practices. When authentication endpoints or login routes are not protected, an attacker can rapidly attempt passwords or one-time passwords against user accounts stored in Cockroachdb. Because Cockroachdb is a distributed SQL database, it can serve many concurrent requests, which may allow an attacker to perform high-volume credential guesses before any backend-side throttling takes effect.

The combination of Restify and Cockroachdb can inadvertently expose timing differences that aid enumeration: queries for existing users may return slightly different response times or status codes depending on whether the username exists in the Cockroachdb cluster. If the API does not use constant-time comparison and does not enforce uniform delays, an attacker can infer valid accounts and then focus brute force efforts on those identities.

Insecure default configurations in some Cockroachdb deployments can also expose authentication-related endpoints if network policies are not properly enforced. Without mutual TLS or IP whitelisting, an attacker who gains network access can attempt direct authentication flows against Restify endpoints, leveraging Cockroachdb as the identity store. The lack of strong multi-factor authentication further increases risk: once passwords are guessed, the attacker gains access to the associated Cockroachdb-backed user resources.

Another vector arises from token or session management flaws. If Restify issues long-lived tokens upon successful authentication without adequate rotation or revocation checks, compromised credentials can be reused across sessions. An attacker who brute forces a password may obtain a session token that grants prolonged access to Cockroachdb-stored data, including potentially sensitive financial or personal records subject to compliance frameworks like PCI-DSS and GDPR.

Because middleBrick scans the unauthenticated attack surface and tests authentication mechanisms, it can identify weak rate limiting, account enumeration leaks, and missing MFA in this stack. The scan checks align with OWASP API Top 10:2023 Broken Object Level Authorization and Credential Stuffing/Brute Force, as well as SOC2 controls related to access management and monitoring.

To secure Restify with Cockroachdb, implement robust rate limiting, uniform error handling, and secure authentication flows. Below are concrete, realistic code examples you can apply.

1. Rate Limiting with Express-style middleware in Restify

Use a token-bucket or fixed-window rate limiter to restrict authentication attempts per IP or per user identifier. This reduces the feasibility of brute force attacks.

const restify = require('restify');
const rateLimit = require('restify-rate-limiter');

const server = restify.createServer();

server.use(rateLimit({
  rate: 5,        // 5 attempts
  window: 60000,  // per 60 seconds
  key: (req) => {
    // key by IP, or by username if you want per-user limits
    return req.username || req.connection.remoteAddress;
  },
  onLimitExceeded: (req, res, options) => {
    res.send(429, { error: 'Too many attempts, try again later.' });
  }
}));

server.post('/login', (req, res, next) => {
  const { username, password } = req.body;
  // authentication logic against Cockroachdb follows
  next();
});

server.listen(8080, () => console.log('API listening on port 8080'));

2. Constant-time comparison and secure password verification

Avoid timing attacks by using constant-time comparison for password hashes and by ensuring error responses are uniform.

const bcrypt = require('bcrypt');
const crypto = require('crypto');

async function verifyPassword(inputPassword, storedHash) {
  // Use timing-safe comparison where possible; bcrypt.compare is generally safe
  const match = await bcrypt.compare(inputPassword, storedHash);
  // Always return the same generic message and status
  return match;
}

server.post('/login', async (req, res, next) => {
  const { username, password } = req.body;
  let user;
  try {
    user = await pool.query('SELECT id, password_hash FROM users WHERE username = $1', [username]);
  } catch (err) {
    return next(new restify.InternalError('Internal server error'));
  }

  const safeResponse = () => res.send(401, { error: 'Invalid credentials' });

  if (!user.rows || user.rows.length === 0) {
    // simulate hash verification to keep timing consistent
    await bcrypt.hash(password, 10);
    return safeResponse();
  }

  const ok = await verifyPassword(password, user.rows[0].password_hash);
  if (!ok) {
    return safeResponse();
  }

  // Issue token, set secure httpOnly cookie, etc.
  const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
  res.setHeader('Set-Cookie', `token=${token}; HttpOnly; Secure; SameSite=Strict`);
  res.send(200, { ok: true });
  return next();
});

3. Prepared statements and parameterized queries in Cockroachdb

Prevent injection and ensure predictable query performance by using parameterized queries rather than string concatenation.

const { Client } = require('pg'); // CockroachDB wire-compatible driver
const pool = new Client({
  connectionString: 'postgresql://user:pass@cockroachdb-host:26257/dbname?sslmode=require'
});

pool.connect().then(() => {
  console.log('Connected to Cockroachdb');
});

async function getUserByUsername(username) {
  const result = await pool.query('SELECT id, email, password_hash FROM users WHERE username = $1', [username]);
  return result.rows[0];
}

async function createUser(email, passwordHash) {
  const result = await pool.query(
    'INSERT INTO users (email, password_hash, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2, now()) RETURNING id',
    [email, passwordHash]
  );
  return result.rows[0].id;
}

4. Enforce MFA and step-up authentication for sensitive operations

Require multi-factor authentication for critical endpoints and consider step-up challenges after initial login to protect high-value actions.

function requireMfa(req, res, next) {
  if (!req.user.mfa_enabled || !req.user.mfa_verified) {
    return res.send(403, { error: 'MFA required for this action' });
  }
  return next();
}

server.post('/account/change-email', requireMfa, (req, res, next) => {
  // perform change with transactional guarantees in Cockroachdb
  res.send(200, { ok: true });
  return next();
});

5. Secure cookie and token handling

Set HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite attributes for session cookies, and rotate tokens on privilege changes.

server.post('/login', async (req, res, next) => {
  // ... after successful auth
  const token = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
  // store hashed token in Cockroachdb with expiry and user_id
  await pool.query(
    'INSERT INTO auth_tokens (user_id, token_hash, expires_at) VALUES ($1, $2, $3)',
    [userId, crypto.createHash('sha256').update(token).digest('hex'), new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000)]
  );
  res.setHeader('Set-Cookie', `token=${token}; HttpOnly; Secure; Path=/; SameSite=Strict; Max-Age=${30 * 24 * 60 * 60}`);
  res.send(200, { ok: true });
  return next();
});

These measures reduce the attack surface for brute force against Restify backed by Cockroachdb and align with middleBrick findings around authentication, rate limiting, and data exposure checks.