HIGH crlf injectionadonisjscockroachdb

Crlf Injection in Adonisjs with Cockroachdb

Crlf Injection in Adonisjs with Cockroachdb — how this specific combination creates or exposes the vulnerability

Crlf Injection occurs when user-controlled data is embedded into headers or logs without sanitization, allowing an attacker to inject carriage return (CR, \r) and line feed (\n) sequences. In Adonisjs, a Node.js framework, this commonly arises when dynamic values such as user IDs, email addresses, or API parameters are passed into response headers (e.g., res.header(), response.redirect()) or log entries without validation. Cockroachdb, a distributed SQL database, is often used as the backend data store for Adonisjs applications. Although Cockroachdb itself does not directly interpret CR or LF characters in SQL values, the vulnerability emerges at the application layer when unsanitized input influences HTTP headers that are later sent to the Cockroachdb-backed services or when log entries containing query metadata are manipulated.

For example, an Adonisjs route that builds a redirect URL using a user-supplied parameter can become exploitable if that parameter includes \r\n. Consider a route like GET /redirect?url=https://api.example.com. If the application does not sanitize the url query parameter and directly uses it in a response header, an attacker can append \r\nSet-Cookie: session=attacker to the URL, causing the injected header to be interpreted by the client. In a Cockroachdb-driven application, this might be combined with session identifiers or tokens stored in the database, enabling session fixation or credential leakage. Similarly, log injection can occur when request metadata (e.g., user-supplied query filters) is written to logs without sanitization, potentially corrupting log structure or obscuring malicious activity related to Cockroachdb operations.

The risk is heightened when Adonisjs applications use environment-based configurations that reference Cockroachdb connection strings or credentials. If an attacker injects CR/LF into a parameter that later influences configuration parsing or header generation, they may alter the effective routing of requests or the formatting of structured logs, complicating audit trails. Because Cockroachdb often serves as a centralized data store, any confusion in logs or headers can make it harder to correlate legitimate queries with injected artifacts, increasing forensic difficulty.

Cockroachdb-Specific Remediation in Adonisjs — concrete code fixes

Remediation centers on strict input validation, output encoding, and secure handling of headers and logs. For HTTP headers in Adonisjs, always validate and sanitize any user input before using it in redirects or header assignments. Use Adonisjs built-in validation schemas to enforce safe formats and reject inputs containing CR or LF characters.

Safe Redirects with Validation

Instead of directly using query parameters in redirects, validate the URL against an allowlist or strict pattern. Below is a secure Adonisjs route example that validates a URL parameter before using it in a redirect, ensuring no CR or LF characters are present.

import { schema, rules } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/Validator'
import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'

export default class RedirectController {
  public async store({ request, response }: HttpContextContract) {
    const urlSchema = schema.create({
      target: schema.string({}, [
        rules.url({ trim: true }),
        rules.regex('^(https?:\/\/)[\w\-\.]+(?:\.[a-z]{2,})+(?:[\\w\-\.~:@!$&\'()*+,;=]*)*$', 'Invalid URL format')
      ])
    })

    const validated = await request.validate({ schema: urlSchema })
    // Safe: validated.target contains no CR/LF due to URL rule
    return response.redirect(validated.target)
  }
}

Sanitized Headers with Explicit Encoding

When setting custom headers that may incorporate dynamic values, explicitly encode or reject control characters. The following example demonstrates setting a safe custom header using a sanitized user identifier retrieved from a Cockroachdb-backed model.

import User from 'App/Models/User'

export async function setCustomHeader({ params, response }: HttpContextContract) {
  const user = await User.findOrFail(params.id)
  // Ensure user.displayName contains no CR/LF before using in header
  const safeName = user.displayName.replace(/[\r\n]/g, '')
  response.header('X-User-Name', safeName)
  response.send({ status: 'ok' })
}

Secure Log Handling for Cockroachdb Queries

When logging Cockroachdb query metadata or user inputs, sanitize all dynamic content to prevent log injection. Use structured logging libraries that escape CR/LF, or manually strip control characters before writing to logs.

import Logger from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/Logger'

export function logQuery(userId: string, filter: string) {
  const safeUserId = userId.replace(/[\r\n]/g, '')
  const safeFilter = filter.replace(/[\r\n]/g, '')
  Logger.info('db_query', { userId: safeUserId, filter: safeFilter })
}

Database Interaction Example

When interacting with Cockroachdb via Adonisjs ORM or query builder, rely on parameterized queries to avoid SQL injection, which is distinct from CRLF issues but often co-occurs in insecure applications. The following example uses parameterized bindings safely.

import Database from '@ioc:Adonis/Lucid/Database'

// Safe parameterized query
const results = await Database.from('profiles').where('user_id', '=', userId).execute()

Frequently Asked Questions

Can CRLF injection affect Cockroachdb query results directly?
No. Cockroachdb interprets SQL syntax and treats CR/LF as ordinary characters in string values. The risk is at the HTTP or logging layer, not inside Cockroachdb query execution.
Does middleBrick detect CRLF injection in Adonisjs APIs that use Cockroachdb?
Yes. middleBrick runs header and log validation checks that identify unsanitized CR/LF sequences in responses and logs, applicable regardless of the database backend such as Cockroachdb.