Graphql Introspection in Chi with Cockroachdb

GraphQL introspection in a Chi application that uses CockroachDB can expose schema details that assist an attacker in crafting targeted queries or injection attempts. In Chi, GraphQL endpoints typically resolve through routes that forward to a database layer. When introspection is enabled in production, an attacker can query the schema to discover types, queries, and mutations, revealing field names, relationships, and potential input structures that map to CockroachDB tables.

Because CockroachDB is a distributed SQL database, its schema definitions (including table names, column types, and constraints) become valuable reconnaissance data when exposed via GraphQL introspection. An attacker who retrieves the schema can infer how data is organized, identify sensitive tables (e.g., user or payment tables), and explore relationships that may lead to Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) or BOLA if authorization checks are incomplete. The combination of a flexible GraphQL layer and a strong-consistency distributed database like CockroachDB means that schema knowledge can be directly mapped to efficient, targeted SQL queries, increasing the risk of data exposure.

For example, an introspection query might return a User type with fields id, email, and tenant_id. If the resolver does not enforce tenant isolation correctly, an attacker can use the discovered schema to manipulate IDs and access other tenants' data. MiddleBrick scans detect such exposure by correlating OpenAPI/Swagger specifications (if present) with runtime introspection responses, flagging unauthenticated introspection as a high-severity finding aligned with OWASP API Top 10 A01: Broken Object Level Authorization.

In a Chi application, common causes include permissive route handling for GraphQL queries and missing environment-based feature flags that disable introspection outside development. Because CockroachDB often serves as the backend for multi-tenant applications, failing to restrict introspection can inadvertently reveal data model details that support privilege escalation or data exfiltration attacks. MiddleBrick’s LLM/AI Security checks also identify whether schema information could be leveraged in prompt injection or jailbreak scenarios when AI-assisted development tools are in use.

To secure a Chi application using CockroachDB, disable or restrict GraphQL introspection in production and enforce strict authorization before any database query. Below are concrete code examples that demonstrate how to configure introspection and validate tenant access in Chi routes.

First, ensure your GraphQL endpoint does not expose introspection in production by conditionally enabling it based on the environment:

;; src/routes/graphql.clj
(ns myapp.routes.graphql
  (:require [com.walmartlabs.lacinia.schema :as schema]
            [myapp.db.cockroach :as db]))

(defonce schema (atom nil))

(defn load-schema []
  (when (nil? @schema)
    (reset! schema
            (schema/compile
             {:schema (slurp "resources/schema.graphql")
              :objects {:resolvers
                        {:query/my-entity (fn [ctx parent resolved-value args]
                                            (let [tenant-id (:tenant-id ctx)]
                                              (db/fetch-entity-by-tenant tenant-id (:id args))))}})))))

(defn graphql-handler [request]
  (when (= (:env (System/getenv)) "production")
    (when (and (= (:request-method request) :post)
               (-> request :params :query str/trim))
      (let [query (:query (:params request))]
        (when (and query (some-> query str/trim re-find #"__schema|__type"))
          {:status 403
           :body "Introspection disabled in production"}))))
  (load-schema)
  ;; proceed with Lacinia or other GraphQL framework
  )

Second, enforce tenant isolation at the database layer in CockroachDB by parameterizing queries with tenant_id, preventing IDOR across tenants:

-- cockroachdb queries in Chi project (SQL embedded in Clojure)
-- Ensure every query includes tenant_id context
SELECT id, email, created_at FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2;

In your Chi middleware, inject the tenant context from the request (e.g., subdomain or JWT) and pass it to the database layer:

;; src/middleware/tenant.clj
(defn wrap-tenant [handler]
  (fn [request]
    (let [tenant-id (extract-tenant-id request)]
      (handler (assoc request :tenant-id tenant-id)))))

(defn extract-tenant-id [request]
  (or (get-in request [:headers "x-tenant-id"])
      (-> request :params :tenant_id)
      :default-tenant))

Finally, use MiddleBrick’s CLI to scan your Chi endpoints and verify that introspection is restricted and tenant checks are effective. The CLI can be run with middlebrick scan <url> to produce a report that highlights any remaining exposure of schema details. For teams integrating security into development workflows, the GitHub Action can fail builds when risk scores degrade, and the MCP Server allows AI coding assistants to trigger scans directly from the IDE.