Identification Failures in Feathersjs with Cockroachdb

Identification failures occur when an API fails to properly enforce access controls on resource identifiers, allowing one user to access or modify another user’s data. In a Feathersjs application backed by Cockroachdb, this typically arises from missing or inconsistent authorization checks in service hooks and from improperly parameterized SQL queries that expose internal identifiers.

Feathersjs uses a service-based architecture where each service can define hooks such as before, after, and error. If a service does not scope queries to the authenticated user, an attacker can manipulate resource IDs in requests (e.g., changing a numeric or UUID identifier in the URL or body) to access other users’ records. With Cockroachdb as the underlying database, this risk is compounded if queries directly interpolate identifiers without parameterization, potentially enabling IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) or confused deputy patterns.

For example, consider a Feathersjs service for user profiles that constructs a Cockroachdb query using a raw identifier from the request:

// Risky: identifier taken directly from params
const { id } = params.query;
const result = await pool.query('SELECT * FROM profiles WHERE id = \'${id}\'');

This approach is vulnerable because the identifier is not validated against the requesting user. An authenticated user could change id to another valid profile identifier and retrieve or modify data they should not access.

Even when using an ORM or query builder, improper scoping can lead to identification failures. For instance, a Feathersjs service might fetch records with a condition that omits the tenant or user context:

// Missing user context in query
const records = await pool.query('SELECT * FROM documents WHERE status = \'active\'');

In a multi-tenant or multi-user Cockroachdb deployment, this returns documents across all users, violating isolation. Authorization checks must ensure that each query includes a user or tenant filter, such as user_id = $1, and that the identifier is verified to belong to the requesting entity before any read or write operation.

Moreover, REST and GraphQL-like patterns in Feathersjs can inadvertently expose identifiers in responses or error messages. If error handling returns detailed database errors, an attacker might infer valid identifier formats or internal schema details. Proper handling involves sanitizing error outputs and ensuring that any returned resource identifiers are scoped and consistent with the authenticated context.

To align with the broader security checks provided by tools such as middleBrick, developers should validate that every service method enforces ownership or role-based constraints. middleBrick’s BOLA/IDOR checks analyze runtime behavior against OpenAPI specifications and can detect whether responses include data that should be restricted, helping to identify these gaps during automated scans.

Remediation focuses on ensuring that every database query includes explicit user or tenant context and that identifiers are treated as untrusted input. Use parameterized queries to prevent injection and enforce row-level security by always filtering on the authenticated subject.

Below are concrete, working Cockroachdb examples for Feathersjs that demonstrate secure identification practices.

1. Parameterized query with user scoping using the pg client:

const { user } = params; // authenticated user object with id
const { id } = params.query;

// Ensure the requested ID matches the authenticated user’s ID
if (id !== user.id) {
  throw new Error('Unauthorized');
}

const result = await pool.query('SELECT * FROM profiles WHERE id = $1 AND user_id = $2', [id, user.id]);
if (result.rows.length === 0) {
  throw new Error('Not found');
}
return result.rows[0];

2. Scoped service find with pagination and user filter using a query builder (e.g., pg-promise):

const userId = params.user.id;
const result = await pool.any(
  'SELECT id, name, email FROM documents WHERE user_id = $1 AND archived = $2 ORDER BY created_at LIMIT $3 OFFSET $4',
  [userId, false, params.pagination.limit, params.pagination.skip]
);
return result;

3. Using Feathers hooks to inject user context before database operations:

// src/hooks/ensure-user-context.js
module.exports = function ensureUserContext(options = {}) {
  return async context => {
    const { user } = context.params;
    if (!user || !user.id) {
      throw new Error('Unauthenticated');
    }
    // Attach user scope to query parameters for downstream handlers
    context.params.query = context.params.query || {};
    context.params.query.user_id = user.id;
    return context;
  };
};

// In service configuration
const { authenticate } = require('@feathersjs/authentication').hooks;
app.service('documents').hooks({
  before: {
    find: [authenticate('jwt'), ensureUserContext()],
    get: [authenticate('jwt'), ensureUserContext()],
    create: [authenticate('jwt'), ensureUserContext()],
    update: [authenticate('jwt'), ensureUserContext()],
    patch: [authenticate('jwt'), ensureUserContext()],
    remove: [authenticate('jwt'), ensureUserContext()]
  }
});

4. Avoiding raw identifier interpolation by using prepared statements or an ORM that supports parameterized inputs. For Cockroachdb, prefer the pg client’s $N placeholder syntax or an abstraction that enforces type-safe queries.

These practices reduce the risk of identification failures by ensuring that every database operation is bound to the requesting user’s identity and that identifiers are validated before use. When combined with automated security scans, such as those offered by middleBrick, teams can detect residual IDOR risks in runtime behavior and API contract mismatches.