Insecure Design in Adonisjs with Dynamodb

Insecure design in an AdonisJS application using DynamoDB typically arises from modeling data and access patterns that rely on the client to enforce authorization, missing server-side checks, and over-permissive IAM policies attached to the DynamoDB credentials used by the application. When authorization logic is implemented only in the UI or via route middleware that does not re-validate data ownership against the record in DynamoDB, attackers can manipulate identifiers and perform Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) / Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR). For example, an endpoint like /api/users/:id/profile might accept a user ID from the client and directly query DynamoDB with a GetItem using that ID. If the request is not authenticated and the authorization check is absent or inconsistent, an attacker can substitute any ID and access another user’s profile because the service trusts the provided identifier without verifying that the authenticated subject owns that item.

DynamoDB-specific insecure design also appears when access patterns do not enforce ownership at the key condition expression level. For instance, using a Global Secondary Index (GSI) to query by userName without including the partition key that ties the item to the requesting user enables broad read access across users. A query like query({ indexName: 'userName-index', KeyConditionExpression: 'userName = :name' }) without a composite key that includes the user’s unique ID exposes data across tenants. Additionally, missing schema-level protections such as attribute-level permissions and conditional writes can lead to data exposure or unsafe updates. Without row-level ownership checks in the query design, the application surface grows, and findings related to BOLA/IDOR and Property Authorization become likely outcomes in a scan.

AdonisJS does not enforce data ownership by default; developers must explicitly encode it. If the route or controller assumes the request payload’s id is trustworthy, and the DynamoDB SDK call uses that value directly, the authorization boundary is effectively bypassed. This becomes critical when combined with features like soft deletes implemented only in application code rather than in conditional expressions on writes. An attacker who guesses or enumerates IDs can bypass soft-delete protections if the query does not filter by a deletion marker attribute. Poor IAM policies that grant dynamodb:GetItem and dynamodb:Query on broad table ARNs further amplify the risk, enabling horizontal privilege escalation across users. The combination of a permissive IAM role, missing ownership checks in key expressions, and trusting client-supplied identifiers creates a design that exposes sensitive data and enables unauthorized operations, which aligns with findings from the 12 security checks, including BOLA/IDOR and Property Authorization.

Remediation centers on enforcing ownership in every DynamoDB request and validating authorization server-side before constructing queries. Always use the authenticated subject’s unique identifier as the partition key or as a required condition in key expressions. For example, if your table uses a composite key where PK encodes USER#<user_id> and SK encodes resource-specific attributes, ensure queries include the full partition key derived from the authenticated user rather than accepting an ID from the client.

Below is a secure pattern in AdonisJS using the AWS SDK for JavaScript v3. The handler resolves the user identifier from the authenticated session, then builds a query that includes the user-specific partition key, avoiding any direct use of client-supplied identifiers for ownership checks.

import { DynamoDBClient, QueryCommand } from "@aws-sdk/client-dynamodb";
import { unmarshall } from "@aws-sdk/util-dynamodb";

const client = new DynamoDBClient({ region: "us-east-1" });

export async function getUserProfilesByAuthenticatedUser({ auth, request }) {
  const user = auth.getUser(); // AdonisJS auth contract
  if (!user || !user.id) {
    throw new Error("Unauthorized");
  }
  const userId = user.id;
  const params = {
    tableName: process.env.DYNAMO_TABLE,
    indexName: "gsi-user-data",
    KeyConditionExpression: "PK = :pk AND begins_with(SK, :sk)",
    ExpressionAttributeValues: {
      ":pk": { S: `USER#${userId}` },
      ":sk": { S: "PROFILE#" }
    }
  };
  const command = new QueryCommand(params);
  const response = await client.send(command);
  return response.Items.map((item) => unmarshall(item));
}

This pattern ensures the partition key is derived from the authenticated user ID, so a malicious ID supplied via request parameters cannot pivot to another user’s data. For endpoints that operate on a specific item, resolve the full key server-side and use GetItem with a condition that the item belongs to the requesting user, for example by checking an attribute like ownerId or by embedding the user ID in the key.

Additionally, apply conditional writes to enforce invariants and prevent unsafe updates. For example, when updating a profile, require that the condition expression checks ownership explicitly:

import { UpdateCommand } from "@aws-sdk/lib-dynamodb";

export async function updateUserProfile({ request, auth }) {
  const user = auth.getUser();
  const input = request.only(["bio", "displayName"]);
  const params = {
    TableName: process.env.DYNAMO_TABLE,
    Key: { PK: { S: `USER#${user.id}` }, SK: { S: "PROFILE" } },
    UpdateExpression: "SET bio = :bio, displayName = :displayName",
    ConditionExpression: "attribute_exists(PK) AND ownerId = :uid",
    ExpressionAttributeValues: {
      ":bio": { S: input.bio },
      ":displayName": { S: input.displayName },
      ":uid": { S: user.id }
    },
    ReturnValuesOnConditionCheckFailure: "ALL_OLD"
  };
  const command = new UpdateCommand(params);
  return await client.send(command);
}

Use DynamoDB’s native attribute-level permissions via IAM policies scoped to the authenticated user’s key prefix, for example by using condition keys such as dynamodb:LeadingKeys to ensure that any request can access only items where the partition key begins with USER#<user_id>. Combine this with row-level ownership checks in your queries and updates to align with Property Authorization findings, and avoid designing queries that rely on client-controlled identifiers without server-side validation.