Insecure Direct Object Reference in Actix with Cockroachdb

Insecure Direct Object Reference (IDOR) occurs when an API exposes internal object references (such as database primary keys) without sufficient authorization checks, allowing attackers to manipulate those references to access unauthorized data. In an Actix web service backed by Cockroachdb, this typically arises when an endpoint uses user-supplied identifiers (e.g., user_id, document_id) to query Cockroachdb directly without validating that the requesting actor has permission to access the targeted resource.

Consider an Actix handler that retrieves a user profile using a path parameter:

async fn get_user_profile(
    path: web::Path,
    db_pool: web::Data>,
) -> Result {
    let user_id = path.into_inner();
    let conn = db_pool.get().await?;
    let user: User = sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, email, name FROM users WHERE id = $1")
        .bind(user_id)
        .fetch_one(&conn)
        .await?;
    Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(user))
}

If the API does not verify that the authenticated caller is allowed to view the requested user_id, an authenticated user can change the path parameter (e.g., from /profile/101 to /profile/102) and access another user’s private data. This is IDOR because the object reference (the numeric user ID) is directly used as an authorization bypass. Cockroachdb does not enforce row-level permissions by default in this pattern; authorization is the responsibility of the application layer in Actix. Attackers may also exploit IDOR to chain access across endpoints, such as using a tampered document_id to retrieve files or billing records that belong to other tenants.

In more complex mappings, an OpenAPI spec might define a path like /documents/{document_id}, and runtime scanning by middleBrick can detect mismatches between the declared authentication requirements and actual runtime behavior, highlighting IDOR risk when unauthenticated or insufficiently scoped requests reach endpoints that expose database identifiers. Without proper checks, an attacker can enumerate identifiers and harvest sensitive information, a pattern commonly flagged under the BOLA/IDOR security check.

To prevent IDOR in Actix with Cockroachdb, implement per-request authorization that validates ownership or access rights before using user-supplied identifiers in SQL queries. Avoid relying on the identifier alone to enforce access control.

1. Enforce ownership checks with contextual identity

Ensure the authenticated subject’s identity is checked against the resource owner. For example, after retrieving the user, compare the resource’s owner ID with the authenticated user’s ID:

async fn get_user_profile(
    user_identity: Identity, // authenticated caller subject
    path: web::Path,
    db_pool: web::Data>,
) -> Result {
    let requester_id: i64 = user_identity.id().parse().map_err(|_| error::ErrorUnauthorized("Invalid subject"))?;
    let target_id = path.into_inner();
    let conn = db_pool.get().await?;
    let user: User = sqlx::query_as("SELECT id, email, name, owner_id FROM users WHERE id = $1")
        .bind(target_id)
        .fetch_one(&conn)
        .await?;
    if user.owner_id != requester_id {
        return Err(error::ErrorForbidden("Access denied"));
    }
    Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(user))
}

This ensures that even if target_id is manipulated, the requester must own the resource to proceed.

2. Use scoped tenant identifiers for multi-tenant data

In a multi-tenant schema where Cockroachdb rows include a tenant_id, bind both the resource ID and the tenant context:

async fn get_document(
    tenant_id: web::Path,
    document_id: web::Path,
    db_pool: web::Data>,
) -> Result {
    let conn = db_pool.get().await?;
    let doc: Document = sqlx::query_as(
        "SELECT id, tenant_id, title, content FROM documents WHERE id = $1 AND tenant_id = $2"
    )
    .bind(document_id.into_inner())
    .bind(tenant_id.into_inner())
    .fetch_one(&conn)
    .await?;
    Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(doc))
}

By including tenant_id in both the route and the SQL predicate, you prevent IDOR across tenants. The route could be structured as /tenants/{tenant_id}/documents/{document_id}, ensuring the server-side check aligns with the URL hierarchy.

3. Avoid direct exposure of Cockroachdb primary keys

When possible, use indirect references (e.g., slugs or UUIDs mapped server-side to primary keys) and perform lookup with authorization:

async fn get_document_by_slug(
    tenant_id: web::Path,
    slug: web::Path,
    db_pool: web::Data>,
) -> Result {
    let conn = db_pool.get().await?;
    let doc: Document = sqlx::query_as(
        "SELECT id, tenant_id, slug, title FROM documents WHERE tenant_id = $1 AND slug = $2"
    )
    .bind(tenant_id.into_inner())
    .bind(slug.into_inner())
    .fetch_one(&conn)
    .await?;
    // Additional authorization can be applied here
    Ok(HttpResponse::Ok().json(doc))
}

This approach reduces predictability of identifiers and keeps authorization close to the data layer. middleBrick scans can validate that such patterns exist and that route parameters are properly constrained by tenant or ownership checks.