Insufficient Logging in Fiber with Cockroachdb

Insufficient logging in a Fiber application that uses Cockroachdb can leave critical security events unrecorded, reducing the ability to detect, investigate, or respond to incidents. When requests interact with Cockroachdb without structured logs and correlation identifiers, opaque SQL errors and transaction states make it difficult to trace whether authentication failures, authorization mismatches, or unexpected query behavior are benign or malicious.

In a typical Fiber handler, developers may omit logging for SQL errors, omit transaction IDs, or log sensitive data such as connection strings or user inputs. This becomes especially risky when combined with Cockroachdb’s distributed nature: queries may span multiple nodes and retries, and without consistent logging, issues like transaction aborts, serialization failures, or privilege-related rejections are invisible or misleading. For example, a BOLA/IDOR attempt might manifest as repeated, slightly altered SQL queries that fail with generic errors; without structured logs and request-level tracing, these patterns are hard to detect.

Consider an endpoint that constructs SQL with string concatenation or poorly parameterized queries. If errors are swallowed or only printed to stdout without context (timestamp, request ID, user/tenant), an attacker can probe the API with crafted payloads while the team remains unaware. Similarly, missing logs around authentication checks and permission verifications means a BFLA/Privilege Escalation attempt may not be flagged. Because middleBrick tests input validation and authorization paths, it can highlight endpoints where logging gaps align with unhandled or opaque database responses, increasing the risk that real attacks go unnoticed.

Compliance mappings such as OWASP API Top 10 (A03:2023 Injection and A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures) and frameworks like SOC2 and PCI-DSS require sufficient audit trails for access and data operations. Without logs that include SQL statement metadata, user context, and outcome status, an API may pass functional tests but fail security audits. middleBrick’s checks for Data Exposure and Input Validation can surface endpoints where error handling is too verbose or too silent, and where logs do not meaningfully support incident response.

To address insufficient logging in Fiber with Cockroachdb, implement structured logging with request-scoped context, consistent error handling, and explicit audit trails for authentication and authorization events. Use a logger that supports fields (e.g., zerolog or logrus) and ensure every request receives a unique trace or correlation ID that propagates through handlers and database calls.

Example: Structured logging with request context and Cockroachdb queries in Fiber

// main.go
package main

import (
	"context"
	"log/slog"
	"net/http"
	"os"

	"github.com/gofiber/fiber/v2"
	"github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
)

var db *pgxpool.Pool
var logger *slog.Logger

func init() {
	// Configure structured logger to stdout with JSON encoding
	handler := slog.NewJSONHandler(os.Stdout, &slog.HandlerOptions{
		Level: slog.LevelDebug,
	})
	logger = slog.New(handler)

	var err error
	db, err = pgxpool.New(context.Background(), "postgresql://user:pass@localhost:26257/defaultdb?sslmode=disable")
	if err != nil {
		logger.Error("failed to connect to cockroachdb", "error", err)
		os.Exit(1)
	}
}

func RequestIDMiddleware(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
	id := c.Get("X-Request-ID")
	if id == "" {
		id = "unknown"
	}
	c.Locals("requestID", id)
	return c.Next()
}

func getUserHandler(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
	reqID := c.Locals("requestID").(string)
	ctx := context.Background()
	var userID string = c.Params("id")

	// Input validation: ensure userID is safe before using in query
	if userID == "" {
		logger.Warn("missing user id", "request_id", reqID)
		return c.Status(http.StatusBadRequest).JSON(fiber.Map{"error": "user id is required"})
	}

	row := db.QueryRow(ctx, "SELECT email, role FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID)
	var email, role string
	err := row.Scan(&email, &role)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Error("failed to fetch user", "request_id", reqID, "user_id", userID, "error", err)
		return c.Status(http.StatusInternalServerError).JSON(fiber.Map{"error": "unable to fetch user"})
	}

	logger.Info("user retrieved", "request_id", reqID, "user_id", userID, "email", email, "role", role)
	return c.JSON(fiber.Map{"id": userID, "email": email, "role": role})
}

func UpdatePermissionHandler(c *fiber.Ctx) error {
	reqID := c.Locals("requestID").(string)
	ctx := context.Background()
	var userID, newRole string
	if err := c.BodyParser(&struct {
		UserID string `json:"userId"`
		Role   string `json:"role"`
	}{
		UserID: c.Params("id"),
		Role:   c.FormValue("role"),
	}); err != nil {
		logger.Warn("invalid body", "request_id", reqID, "error", err)
		return c.Status(http.StatusBadRequest).JSON(fiber.Map{"error": "invalid payload"})
	}

	// Enforce authorization: ensure requester has permission to change role (simplified)
	// In practice, validate against an admin flag or RBAC rules.
	if newRole == "" {
		logger.Warn("missing role in update", "request_id", reqID, "user_id", userID)
		return c.Status(http.StatusBadRequest).JSON(fiber.Map{"error": "role is required"})
	}

	res, err := db.Exec(ctx, "UPDATE user_roles SET role = $1 WHERE user_id = $2", newRole, userID)
	if err != nil {
		logger.Error("failed to update permission", "request_id", reqID, "user_id", userID, "error", err)
		return c.Status(http.StatusInternalServerError).JSON(fiber.Map{"error": "unable to update permission"})
	}

	rowsAffected, _ := res.RowsAffected()
	logger.Info("permission updated", "request_id", reqID, "user_id", userID, "role", newRole, "rows_affected", rowsAffected)
	return c.JSON(fiber.Map{"updated": rowsAffected})
}

func main() {
	app := fiber.New()
	app.Use(RequestIDMiddleware)

	app.Get("/users/:id", getUserHandler)
	app.Post("/users/:id/role", UpdatePermissionHandler)

	logger.Info("server starting on :8080")
	if err := app.Listen(":8080"); err != nil {
		logger.Error("server failed", "error", err)
	}
}

Key remediation practices

• Use structured logging (JSON) with consistent fields: request_id, user_id, endpoint, method, sql_query (sanitized), error, outcome.
• Propagate a request-scoped correlation ID through middleware so logs across handlers and Cockroachdb calls are traceable.
• Log both successes and failures for sensitive operations (authentication, role/permission changes) to support audit trails without logging sensitive values like passwords.
• Ensure database driver timeouts and retries are logged; Cockroachdb may return retryable errors that should be recorded at appropriate severity levels.
• Map log events to compliance frameworks (e.g., PCI-DSS requirement 10, SOC2 CC6.1) by ensuring logs contain sufficient detail for post-incident analysis.