Missing Authentication in Chi with Cockroachdb

When building HTTP services in Chi, connecting to Cockroachdb without enforcing authentication at the application layer can expose dangerous attack surfaces. Missing authentication in this context means that an endpoint either does not validate the identity of the caller before interacting with the database, or it trusts client-supplied identifiers (such as IDs in URLs) without verifying that the caller is authorized to access that specific resource.

In a typical Chi route, a developer might extract a user ID from the request context or URL parameters and directly construct a query to Cockroachdb. If the route does not first confirm the requester’s identity (for example via session tokens, API keys, or JWTs) and then enforce that the requested resource belongs to that identity, an attacker can manipulate the ID to access or modify other users’ data. This pattern is commonly seen in BOLA/IDOR vulnerabilities, where the absence of proper ownership checks allows horizontal or vertical privilege escalation.

Consider a Chi route that fetches a user profile by ID from the URL without verifying that the authenticated caller owns that ID:

func getUserProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    vars := mux.Vars(r)
    userID := vars["user_id"]
    row := db.QueryRow(context.Background(), "SELECT email, name FROM users WHERE id = $1", userID)
    var email, name string
    if err := row.Scan(&email, &name); err != nil {
        http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
        return
    }
    w.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("Email: %s, Name: %s", email, name)))
}

In this example, if the caller does not present an authenticated identity and the API relies only on the user_id from the URL, any attacker can enumerate or tamper with IDs to retrieve or affect other users’ data. Even when authentication is handled elsewhere (for example, by an external proxy), failing to propagate and validate identity within Chi means the service treats unauthenticated or loosely authenticated requests as safe to query Cockroachdb.

The risk is compounded when combined with Cockroachdb’s behavior: SQL queries constructed with unchecked inputs can lead to unintended data exposure or injection. While Cockroachdb supports parameterized queries (which should always be used), the application must still enforce that the authenticated principal is allowed to access the targeted row. Without this check, the database faithfully executes queries but returns data the caller should not see.

middleBrick detects this pattern during black-box scanning by observing unauthenticated access to endpoints that interact with backend data stores and by correlating spec definitions with runtime behavior. Findings include missing authentication requirements on sensitive endpoints and improper authorization checks before database operations. Remediation guidance focuses on ensuring every data access path validates identity and enforces per-request authorization against the subject making the request.

To remediate missing authentication in Chi when working with Cockroachdb, enforce authentication at the route level and bind the authenticated subject to every database query. Use middleware to validate credentials (e.g., JWT verification or session lookup) and store the subject in the request context. Then ensure queries include both the resource identifier and the subject’s identity to enforce ownership.

Example: secure Chi route with JWT-based authentication and per-request ownership check:

import (
    "context"
    "fmt"
    "net/http"
    "github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
    "github.com/golang-jwt/jwt/v5"
    "github.com/lib/pq"
)

type Claims struct {
    UserID string `json:"user_id"`
    jwt.RegisteredClaims
}

func authMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
    return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        tokenString := extractToken(r)
        token, err := jwt.ParseWithClaims(tokenString, &Claims{}, func(token *jwt.Token) (interface{}, error) {
            return []byte("your-secret-key"), nil
        })
        if err != nil || !token.Valid {
            http.Error(w, "unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
            return
        }
        ctx := context.WithValue(r.Context(), "claims", token.Claims.(*Claims))
        next.ServeHTTP(w, r.WithContext(ctx))
    })
}

func getSecureUserProfile(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
    claims := r.Context().Value("claims").(*Claims)
    vars := chi.URLParam(r, "user_id")
    var email, name string
    err := db.QueryRow(
        r.Context(),
        "SELECT email, name FROM users WHERE id = $1 AND owner_id = $2",
        vars,
        claims.UserID,
    ).Scan(&email, &name)
    if err != nil) {
        if err == pq.ErrNoRows {
            http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
            return
        }
        http.Error(w, "server error", http.StatusInternalServerError)
        return
    }
    w.Write([]byte(fmt.Sprintf("Email: %s, Name: %s", email, name)))
}

Key points in this fix:

• Authentication is enforced via authMiddleware, which validates a JWT and injects the subject’s claims into the request context.
• The handler retrieves the authenticated subject’s ID from the context and uses it in the SQL WHERE clause to ensure the caller can only access their own row (owner_id = $2).
• Parameterized queries prevent injection, and the subject binding ensures that even if an attacker manipulates user_id in the URL, they cannot read or modify records belonging to other users.

For broader protection, apply similar patterns across all endpoints that interact with Cockroachdb. When using the middleBrick CLI to scan from terminal with middlebrick scan <url>, you can validate that your routes require authentication and that database queries consistently include subject-level checks. In automated workflows, the GitHub Action can add API security checks to your CI/CD pipeline and fail builds if risk scores drop below your chosen threshold.