Open Redirect in Adonisjs with Api Keys

An open redirect in an AdonisJS application that also uses API keys can amplify security risks by enabling authenticated-looking redirection paths that bypass expected authorization boundaries. In AdonisJS, routes often rely on named routes or dynamic URL parameters to determine the destination after authentication or authorization steps. If an endpoint accepts a redirect target (e.g., a next or redirect_to query parameter) without strict validation, an attacker can supply a malicious external URL. When API keys are used to identify or scope access, the presence of a valid key may lead developers to assume stronger authentication than exists, inadvertently relaxing redirect validation.

Consider an AdonisJS route protected by an API key header (e.g., X-API-Key) that processes a redirect after confirming the key. If the route does not enforce a strict allowlist of domains for the redirect target, an attacker can supply a crafted URL such as https://api.example.com/auth?next=https://evil.com. Even when the API key is valid, the application may perform the redirect to the attacker-controlled site, leveraging the trust placed in the key to increase the likelihood that a victim follows the redirect. This pattern is commonly seen in OAuth or SSO flows where a redirect is used after authentication, and the API key is mistakenly treated as proof of intent or identity rather than merely an access credential.

The combination of API keys and open redirects also complicates detection and logging. Because API keys are often treated as opaque tokens, monitoring may focus on invalid key usage while overlooking unsafe redirect behavior. In an AdonisJS application, if middleware that validates API keys does not also enforce strict redirect destination checks, the vulnerability remains hidden in seemingly legitimate requests. Attackers can exploit this to phish users, distribute malware, or evade referral-based security mechanisms. The risk is especially relevant when the API key is intended for service-to-service communication but the application also exposes user-facing endpoints that perform redirects based on uncontrolled input.

From an OWASP API Top 10 perspective, this scenario maps to Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) and Improper Neutralization of Redirects or Forwards when untrusted input influences navigation. Although the API key may be valid, the lack of destination validation means the application does not enforce where the authenticated context leads. Real-world examples include redirect chains that pass through compromised identity providers or third-party services that do not enforce referrer checks. The presence of API keys should not reduce the rigor applied to validating redirect targets; in AdonisJS, this means explicitly checking the host and path against a defined set of trusted locations before issuing any HTTP redirect response.

middleBrick scans such configurations as part of its 12 security checks, including Input Validation and Property Authorization, identifying missing allowlists for redirect parameters even when API keys are present. Its findings highlight whether an endpoint reflects or redirects to external hosts without appropriate safeguards. While middleBrick detects and reports these patterns, developers must implement strict redirect validation and avoid using untrusted input to construct response headers or location values in AdonisJS applications.

To remediate open redirect risks in AdonisJS when using API keys, implement explicit validation of redirect targets and ensure API key checks do not implicitly authorize arbitrary navigation. The following code examples demonstrate secure patterns for handling redirects alongside API key verification.

First, define a small utility function that validates a redirect URL against an allowlist of trusted hosts. This prevents open redirects regardless of the presence of an API key:

// utils/redirectValidation.ts
import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'

export function validateRedirectUrl(url: string, allowedHosts: string[]): boolean {
  try {
    const parsed = new URL(url)
    return allowedHosts.includes(parsed.hostname)
  } catch {
    return false
  }
}

Next, in your authentication or session route handler, use the utility before performing any redirect. The API key is checked first, but the redirect URL is still validated independently:

// controllers/AuthController.ts
import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'
import { validateRedirectUrl } from 'App/Utils/redirectValidation'

export async function handleLoginWithKey({ request, response }: HttpContextContract) {
  const apiKey = request.header('X-API-Key')
  const redirectTo = request.qs().next || '/dashboard'

  // Validate API key (example lookup)
  const isValidKey = await verifyApiKey(apiKey)
  if (!isValidKey) {
    return response.unauthorized()
  }

  // Strict redirect validation
  const allowedHosts = ['app.example.com', 'dashboard.example.com']
  if (!validateRedirectUrl(redirectTo, allowedHosts)) {
    return response.badRequest({ error: 'Invalid redirect target' })
  }

  return response.redirect(redirectTo)
}

async function verifyApiKey(key: string | undefined): Promise {
  if (!key) return false
  // Replace with actual key lookup logic
  return key === process.env.SERVICE_API_KEY
}

For routes that use the AdonisJS middleware stack, you can encapsulate this logic in a named middleware to keep controllers clean:

// middleware/ValidateRedirectAndApiKey.ts
import { HttpContextContract } from '@ioc:Adonis/Core/HttpContext'

export default class ValidateRedirectAndApiKey {
  protected allowedHosts = ['app.example.com', 'dashboard.example.com']

  public async handle(ctx: HttpContextContract, next: () => Promise) {
    const apiKey = ctx.request.header('X-API-Key')
    const isValidKey = await this.verifyApiKey(apiKey)
    if (!isValidKey) {
      return ctx.response.unauthorized()
    }

    const redirectTo = ctx.request.qs().next || '/dashboard'
    if (!this.validateRedirectUrl(redirectTo)) {
      return ctx.response.badRequest({ error: 'Invalid redirect target' })
    }

    await next()
  }

  private validateRedirectUrl(url: string): boolean {
    try {
      const parsed = new URL(url)
      return this.allowedHosts.includes(parsed.hostname)
    } catch {
      return false
    }
  }

  private async verifyApiKey(key: string | undefined): Promise {
    if (!key) return false
    return key === process.env.SERVICE_API_KEY
  }
}

When integrating with the GitHub Action or CLI, ensure that scans include endpoints that use API keys with redirect parameters. middleBrick can detect missing host allowlists even when API key checks are present, helping you align runtime behavior with secure coding practices. The dashboard and continuous monitoring features in the Pro plan can track these endpoints over time, reducing the risk of accidental misconfiguration as your route definitions evolve.

Finally, avoid using raw request query parameters for redirects without normalization and validation. If your application must support dynamic destinations, use an indirect mapping (e.g., alias names resolved server-side) instead of passing full URLs. This approach, combined with API key verification, maintains security boundaries and prevents open redirect abuse in AdonisJS applications.