Sql Injection in Axum with Cockroachdb

SQL injection in an Axum application using CockroachDB arises when user-controlled input is incorporated into SQL statements without proper validation or parameterization. Axum is a web application framework for Rust, and while it does not include an ORM by default, developers often integrate SQL libraries such as sqlx or diesel to interact with CockroachDB, a PostgreSQL-compatible distributed database. The risk occurs when dynamic queries are constructed by concatenating strings with user input, enabling attackers to alter query logic.

For example, consider an endpoint that retrieves user details by username. If the implementation builds the query via string formatting, an attacker can supply a payload such as ' OR '1'='1 to bypass authentication or extract unintended data. Because CockroachDB speaks the PostgreSQL wire protocol, common PostgreSQL-oriented injection techniques apply, including crafted boolean conditions and UNION-based extraction. In an unauthenticated scan, middleBrick tests endpoints that accept external input and attempts to infer database behavior through error-based or blind techniques, looking for signs of injection such as unexpected delays, altered response content, or error messages that reveal schema details.

Another relevant pattern is the use of dynamic table or column names, which cannot be parameterized with prepared statements. If Axum handlers interpolate identifiers directly from request parameters, attackers may leverage injection to enumerate tables or columns, potentially exposing sensitive datasets. Since CockroachDB supports standard SQL syntax, payloads aligned with OWASP API Top 10 A03:2023 — Injection remain effective. MiddleBrick’s checks include input validation tests that probe for these injection vectors and map findings to compliance frameworks such as PCI-DSS and SOC2.

Additionally, improper error handling in Axum can amplify the impact. Verbose database errors returned to clients may expose stack traces or table structures, aiding further exploitation. When combined with missing rate limiting or inadequate input sanitization, an API endpoint can become an easy target. middleBrick’s unauthenticated scans detect such weaknesses by sending malicious payloads and analyzing responses, ensuring that issues like authentication bypass or data exposure are surfaced with severity and remediation guidance.

To mitigate SQL injection in Axum when working with CockroachDB, always use parameterized queries with prepared statements. This ensures that user input is treated strictly as data, not executable SQL. The sqlx crate is commonly used with Axum and supports this approach natively. Below is a safe example using a prepared statement with named parameters.

use axum::{routing::get, Router};
use sqlx::{postgres::PgPoolOptions, PgPool};
use std::net::SocketAddr;

#[derive(sqlx::FromRow)]
struct User {
    id: i32,
    username: String,
    email: String,
}

async fn get_user_by_username(pool: PgPool, username: String) -> Result {
    let user = sqlx::query_as!(User, "SELECT id, username, email FROM users WHERE username = $1", username)
        .fetch_one(&pool)
        .await?;
    Ok(user)
}

#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
    let pool = PgPoolOptions::new()
        .connect("postgresql://user:password@host:26257/dbname?sslmode=require")
        .await
        .expect("Failed to connect");

    let app = Router::new().route("/users/:username", get(move |username: String| get_user_by_username(pool.clone(), username)));

    let addr = SocketAddr::from(([127, 0, 0, 1], 3000));
    axum::Server::bind(&addr).serve(app.into_make_service()).await.unwrap();
}

For dynamic identifiers such as table or column names, use a strict allowlist approach. Map incoming values to known safe identifiers before including them in the query. Below is an example that selects from a predefined set of tables, avoiding direct concatenation of user input.

async fn query_table(pool: PgPool, table_key: String, user_id: i32) -> Result<Vec "admins",
        "members" => "members",
        _ => "users", // default safe choice
    };
    let rows = sqlx::query("SELECT id, username, email FROM ")
        .bind(table_name)
        .fetch_all(&pool)
        .await?;
    // deserialize rows into User struct omitted for brevity
    Ok(vec![])
}

In addition to query construction, ensure that error messages do not leak internal details. Configure Axum’s error handling to return generic responses while logging detailed errors server-side. Combine these practices with middleBrick’s CLI tool to validate fixes: run middlebrick scan <url> to confirm that the endpoint no longer triggers injection findings. For teams integrating security into development workflows, the middleBrick GitHub Action can enforce a minimum security score by failing builds when regressions are detected, while the MCP Server allows scanning APIs directly from IDEs used by Rust developers.