Information Disclosure in Chi with Cockroachdb

Information Disclosure in Chi when using Cockroachdb typically arises from misconfigured SQL queries, overly verbose error messages, or improper handling of result sets that expose schema details, row data, or internal identifiers. Chi is a lightweight HTTP router for Go, and when endpoints query Cockroachdb without strict input validation and output filtering, responses can inadvertently reveal sensitive information such as table structures, row counts, or internal IDs.

For example, a route like /api/users/{id} that directly interpolates user-supplied IDs into SQL without parameterization can expose whether a record exists through timing differences or error messages. Cockroachdb returns detailed error messages for malformed queries or constraint violations; if these are returned directly to the client, an attacker can learn about database schema, indexes, or even guess valid IDs through differential responses.

When using the OpenAPI/Swagger spec analysis feature of middleBrick, definitions for Cockroachdb-backed endpoints can be cross-referenced with runtime findings. If the spec describes a GET /pets/{petId} endpoint but runtime probing triggers SQL errors that disclose column names or table constraints, this becomes a finding in the Information Disclosure category with severity and remediation guidance included in the report.

In a Chi service, developers might write handlers that log full query results for debugging. If these logs or responses include sensitive fields such as email addresses or internal UUIDs, and the logs are accessible to unauthorized users, this constitutes information disclosure. The scanner tests unauthenticated attack surfaces and checks whether responses contain patterns like API keys or PII, which is especially important for Cockroachdb deployments where replication and backup metadata might be exposed through verbose error payloads.

middleBrick’s 12 security checks run in parallel, including Input Validation and Data Exposure, to detect cases where Cockroachdb responses leak data through HTTP bodies or headers. The LLM/AI Security checks also ensure that system prompts related to database handling are not leaked through model outputs, which could indirectly expose query logic or schema details.

To prevent Information Disclosure in Chi with Cockroachdb, ensure all database interactions use parameterized queries and that responses are sanitized before being sent to the client. Below are concrete code examples demonstrating secure practices.

First, use prepared statements with the pgx driver to safely pass parameters to Cockroachdb:

import (
    "context"
    "github.com/jackc/pgx/v5/pgxpool"
    "net/http"
)

func getUserHandler(pool *pgxpool.Pool) http.HandlerFunc {
    return func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
        id := r.URL.Query().Get("id")
        if id == "" {
            http.Error(w, "missing id", http.StatusBadRequest)
            return
        }
        var name string
        // Safe parameterized query to prevent SQL injection and info leakage
        err := pool.QueryRow(r.Context(), "SELECT name FROM users WHERE id = $1", id).Scan(&name)
        if err != nil {
            // Generic error to avoid schema disclosure
            http.Error(w, "not found", http.StatusNotFound)
            return
        }
        w.Write([]byte(name))
    }
}

Second, avoid exposing Cockroachdb-specific error details in production. Instead of returning the full error, map known errors to generic messages:

func safeQuery(pool *pgxpool.Pool, query string, args ...interface{}) (string, error) {
    var result string
    err := pool.QueryRow(context.Background(), query, args...).Scan(&result)
    if err != nil {
        // Log detailed error internally, return generic response
        return "", fmt.Errorf("request failed")
    }
    return result, nil
}

Third, ensure that any OpenAPI spec generated for Chi services does not include debug endpoints or verbose error schemas. Use middleware to strip sensitive headers and limit response bodies for endpoints backed by Cockroachdb. middleBrick’s Dashboard can track these changes over time, and the Pro plan’s continuous monitoring can alert you if a new endpoint introduces disclosure risks.

Finally, when integrating with LLM-assisted development via the MCP Server, scan your APIs directly from your IDE to catch potential disclosure issues early. The scanner will flag endpoints where Cockroachdb errors might expose stack traces or schema details, helping you maintain secure defaults without disrupting development workflows.